A favourite trope of the left is to compare illegal immigration today to past colonial ventures by the white man.
Of course, Radish Issue 12 was comprehensive in its full frontal assault on 20th century anti-colonialism. But, as he always does, Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn provides an essential underlying historical point (p. 340):
For civilisation, I would suggest that any two of a written language, the wheel, and monolithic buildings would be sufficient to qualify. Unless there is something so well hidden that we haven’t discovered it at some point between 1776 and today, Aboriginals did not have any of these markers of civilisation. They retained the same level of achievement that we moved beyond quite a while ago.
Knowing there was a pre-existing people in an unsettled country, who governed Australia? No one. The concept of ‘Australia’ is purely a European one. Aboriginals had no concept of a single political organisation that would rule over the island continent, and they certainly wouldn’t have called it the ‘South Land’ (in Latin no less!). The ‘first Australians’ were those with political rights in 1901 because that is when the concept came to fruition.
As best as could be argued, tribal elders, old family members, controlled socially unacceptable behaviour, which was perfectly reasonable for a Stone Age, hunter-gatherer people. But the reality is that this is insufficient for the various tribes to be considered ‘sovereign’ according as the definition requires.
From Davis, there was no equality of states between Aboriginal culture and European civilisation. There was no institution to allow for loans, they had no ambassadors, and they had no ability to make treaties that formalise international relations. They did not hold the same number of rights as states, and therefore were not.
‘Immigration’ began to occur in 1901 with the declaration of Australia’s sovereignty, and was immediately controlled to ensure that Anglo-Australians would form the backbone of the new ‘nation-state’. Prior to that, there was colonisation of a non-sovereign territory, and the displacement of the primitive inhabitants by a superior power. Nothing sinister. Nothing unusual. Nothing that requires reparation. Only acceptance of an inevitable new status quo.
And, of course, Davis bears out my argument (p. 66):
But the High Court of Australia disagreed in 1992. But it wouldn’t have from 1901 until well into the latter half of the 20th century. And now, with a precedent set by an activist judiciary that had no interest in the original intention of the Constitution, we are subjected to a barrage of revisionist, leftist propaganda equivocating the political situation in Europe with the territories of the various tribes.
There is one piece of cognitive dissonance that never fails to amuse me, though. Ethnic replacement was terrible for the Aboriginal people, but it enriches us, and is essential for the future.
Colonies are not ‘immigration nations’. They are a deliberate act by a superior civilisation to expand into non-sovereign territory with the intention of increasing the area that the coloniser has to breed in. To argue otherwise is the worst kind of sophistry.